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India's Energy Security of 
Supply and the Gulf 
Akhilesh Chandra Prabhakar* 
Abstract 
F o n t  the biilge of Afiicn to Iiidoiiesin vin West Asin, CeiitrnI 
Asin, Soirth Asin, Soiith Ensf Asin, the Giilflins been of vital 
iizferests to  the Wesferii Powers, siiice tiiiie iiiiiiieiiiorinl for 
iiiultipie rensoiis. Sitiinted at this jiiiictioti of three continents- 
7Z(Ii?Ze11j, Asin, Afiicn mid Europe, the Girlfregioii provides liiiknges 
over h i i d  mid across sen betzoeeii Europe niid the Iiidinii 
siibconfiizeiit oii the oize side nizd Africa niid Iizdin oii the other 
side. I f  offers the shortest niid chenpest trade niid frniisit rotites 
between flze West niid the Enst. I f  coiiiiiiniids n vast reservoir of 
oil, nbozif 60 per cent of flze zuorld's proveii reserves of oil, wliiclz 
eiioriiioiisly coiifribiifes to flze nffliieiice of the Western World, 
especinlly the Uiiifed Strifes. 
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Oil is the cornerstone of the international economic system 
in that it determines the power equation. Whoever can 
decisively influence the production, flows and prices of oil 
is able to steer the global polity. Petroleum accounts right 
now for 40 per cent of the total energy consumption in the 
world and the percentage will only increase since global 
demand is expected to rise by 50 per cent during the next 
twenty years. The control and exploitation of oil resources 
h a  always been a bone of contention between the western 
powers and oil producing countries. The question has also 
emerged as to what will be the effects of global geo-politics 
on an energy-consuming country like India? The main 
objective of this research is to study the effects of global 
geopolitics on Indian energy security of supply. This study 
also looks at: 




How much 09 is imported and from where? 
What is the relation between population growth and 
oil and gas consumption (projected for 20 years)? 
4. What are the scenarios for an Indian oil and gas security 
of supply strategy? 
Methodology 
This study is based on an analytical approach to 
contemporary world politics. It is also based on primary 
sources. Local data/resources from Internet and various 
libraries from India have been used. In addition, seminars, 
workshops and symposiums were organised in Delhi and 
Mumbai, and meetings/discussions were held with various 
governmental or non-governmental organisations’ experts 
in related areas. 
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Hypothesis 
India could easily overcome the US strategic preponderance 
and effectively block Washington’s diplomatic and military 
unilateralism by cooperating and allying with Russia, and 
with certain Asian nations such as China. 
Concept of Energy Security 
Epergy security is the emerging vital issue today, without 
which nations cannot actually promote industrial and 
economic growth. In the rapidly industrialising economies, 
a primary concern has been with respect to energy security. 
Oil and gas continue to play a pre-eminent role in meeting 
the energy requirements of the world. The concept of energy 
security is not new and covers a vast range of issues and 
types of resources. The industrial revolution altered the use 
of energy in fundamental ways, especially in terms of the 
role of commercial energy in society and geopolitics. 
Expansion of industrialisation across the world inevitably 
requires increasing consump tion of energy resources. World 
energy demand (as primary fuel) has grown by nearly 95 
per cent during the past 30 years and is likely to grow by 
over 52 per cent during the next two decades. The demand 
for natural gas is expecting to grow by as much as 97 per 
cent and that for oil by over 42 per cent.’ 
The developed world’s concept of ’energy security’ has 
evolved in the context of its excessive dependence on 
imported energy and the localisation of supplies in the 
Persian Gulf. The focus of policy till the oil shocks of the 
1970s was mainly on supply management, in its widest 
sense. After the oil shocks, many in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
have also paid equal attention to demand management and 
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investment in energy saving technologies as well as 
alternative sources of energy. The concept of energy security 
was, thus, made more comprehensive, including both 
demand and supply side strategies. Geopolitics of energy 
has had a major influence on world events during the 
twentieth century and continues to do so even in the twenty- 
first century. 
Geopolitics of Energy and Its Security 
The pattern of consumption of energy is expected to change. 
Since 1990, the demand for all types of energy has shifted 
from the industrialised countries to developing Asia, in 
particular China and India. By 2020, the share of the 
developing countries in energy demand is expected to 
increase to 46 per cent while that of the developed countries 
is likely to drop to 40 per cent or so. 
Although great power politics has always been a factor in 
managing access and control over energy resources, in the 
emerging situatidn, many of the players in the energy 
scenario are going to be different. The Afghanistan war has 
already given the US a pretext to get hold of the Central 
Asian and Caspian Sea Oil producing regions, amounting 
to 26 per cent of the world reserves and making it harder for 
China to access them without American cooperation. US 
troops have been positioned in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
to protect the oil routes. Military instructors have been 
deployed in Georgia, host to a key segment of the pipeline 
connecting the Caspian Sea with the Black Sea and 
Mediterranean. The 1,500 km pipeline, stretching from 
Kazakhstan’s Ten@ oil field to Russia’s Black Sea port of 
Novorossysk, carried 14.78 mn tomes (295,000 b/d) of crude 
for export during 2003. In the longer term, the American 
objective is to make sure that Russian oil is directed to the 
West and not towards Asia while encircling China within a 
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network of alliances with Russia, India, South Korea, Taiwan 
and Japan. 
According to that strategy, taking control of Iraq’s oil while 
plotting to seize Iran’s is tantamount to acquiring the means 
of tightening the energy noose around China, thus 
discouraging Beijing’s temp tation to challenge American 
supremacy in the future. That is a major card to make the 
twenty-first century an American-dominated one. To 
dominate West Asia geopolitical and economically, the US 
must destroy resistance in Iraq; help Israel impose a 
Bantustan settlement on the Palestinians that ensures its 
permanent domination or simply allow Israel to continue 
its brutal repression. Israel is building a wall in the West 
Bank to further imprison the Palestinians, take away more 
land and force people to leave. 
For the past 30 years, the Gulf has been in the crosshairs of 
an influential group of Washington foreign policy strategists, 
who believe that in order to ensure its global dominance, 
the United States must seize control of the region and its oil. 
In the geopolitical vision driving current US policy toward 
Iraq, the key to national security is global hegemony 
dominance over any and all potential rivals. To that end, 
the United States must not only be able to project its military 
forces anywhere, at any time. It must also control key 
resources, chief among them oil-and especially Gulf oil. To 
the hawks who now set the tone at the White House and the 
Pentagon, the region is crucial not simply for its share in the 
US oil supply (other sources have become more important 
over the years), but because it would allow the United States 
to maintain a lock on the world’s energy lifeline and 
p’otentially deny access to its global competitors. The 
administration “believes you have to control resources in 
order to have access to them,” says Chas Freeman, who 
%. 
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served as US ambassador to Saudi Arabia under the first 
President Bush. ”They are taken with the idea that the end 
of the cold war left the United States able to impose its will 
globally- and that those who have the ability to shape events 
with power have the duty to do so. It’s ideology.” 
Iraq, in this view, is a strategic prize of unparalleled 
importance. Unlike the oil beneath Alaska’s frozen tundra, 
1ocked.away in the steppes of central Asia, or buried under 
storm? seas, Iraq’s crude is readily accessible and, at less 
than $1.50 a barrel, some of the cheapest in the world to 
produce. 
”Controlling Iraq is about oil as power, rather than oil as 
fuel,” says Michael Klare, Professor of Peace and World 
Security Studies at Hampshire College and author of 
Resource Wars. Tontrol over the Persian Gulf translates 
into control over Europe, Japan, and China. It’s having our 
hand on the spigot.” 
Ever since the oil shotks of the 1970s, the United States has 
steadily been accumulating military muscle in the Gulf by 
building bases, selling weaponry, and forging military 
partnerships. Now, it is poised to consolidate its might in a 
place that will be a fulcrum of the world’s balance of power 
for decades to come. At a stroke, by taking control of Iraq, 
the Bush Administration can solidify a long-running 
strategic design. “It‘s the &singer plan,” says James Akins, 
a former US diplomat. ”I thought it had been killed, but it’s 
back.” 
. 
In 1975, while Akins was ambassador in Saudi Arabia, an 
article headlined ”Seizing Arab Oil” appeared in Hnrper’s. 
The author, who used the pseudonym Miles Ignotus, was 
identified as ”a Washington-based professor and defense 
consultant with intimate links to high-level US 
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policymakers.” The article outlined, as Akins puts it, “how 
we could solve all our economic and political problems by 
taking over the Arab oil fields (and) bringing in Texans and 
Oklahomans to operate them.” Simultaneously, a rash of 
similar stories appeared in other magazines and newspapers. 
“I knew that it had to have been the result of a-deep 
background briefing,” Akins says. 
AS vital as the Persian ~ u l f  is now, its strategic importance 
is likely to grow exponentially in the next 20 years. Nearly 
one out of every three barrels of oil reserves in the world lie 
under just two countries: Saudi Arabia (with 259 billion 
barrels of proven reserves) and Iraq (112 billion). Those 
figures may understate Iraq’s largely unexplored reserves, 
which according to US government estimates may hold as 
many as 432 billion barrels. 
With supplies in many other regions, especially the United 
States and the North Sea, nearly exhausted, oil from Saudi 
Arabia and Iriq is becoming ever more critical- a fact duly 
noted in the administration’s National Energy Policy, 
released in 2001 by a White House task force. By 2020, the 
Gulf will supply between 54 per cent and 67 per cent of the 
world’s crude, the document said, making the region “vital 
to US interests.” 
’. 
The Bush Administration‘s approach to the philosophy of 
Admiral Mahan, the ninenteenth-century military strategist 
who advocated the use of naval power to create a global 
American empire. “They want to be the world’s enforcer,” 
he says. “It’s a worldview, a geopolitical position. They say, 
‘we need hegemony in the region.” 
According to Qamar Agha: “The USA is exploring the 
possibility of entering the new oil market of Central Asia in 
.I26 
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a big way. Its plan is to bring oil and gas through pipelines 
to South Asia and Europe via countries over which it exerts 
substantial political influence and bypass Iran and Russia. 
Both these countries have large proven resefves of energy 
resources but are opposing the USA moves in the region. 
The USA is directly or indirectly involved in the containment 
of Iran and Russia. However, the American oil cartels are 
insisting that Iran, which has the second largest gas reserves 
in the World and has 93 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, 
be included in the future set-up. Otherwise, they will have 
to spend billions of dollars to bring oil by an alternative route 
under the Caspian Sea through the Caucasus via Azerbaijan 
and Georgia and then across Turkey, known as Baku-Ceyhan 
corridor which links this region to Europe. The other plan is 
to bring' oil and gas through pipelines to Pakistan via 
Afghanistan." He also stated that "five companies dominate 
the world oil industry, two US-based, two primarily UK- 
based, and one based in France. US-based Exxon Mobile is 
the largest among thb world's oil companies. The US 
consequently ranks first in the corporate oil sector, with the 
UK second and France third. American and British oil ' 
companies had long held three-quarters of Iraq's oil 
production, but they lost their position in 1972 with the 
nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company. After the 
nationalisation, Iraq turned to the French and Soviet 
govemments for funds and partnerships. Now the US and 
UK oil cartels are keen to region their former position, which 
they see as critical to their future leading role in the global 
oil industry. They see control over West and Central Asian 
oil as essential to their broader 'military, geopolitical and 
economic interests'. Direct military intervention by the US- 
UK would definitely help Exxon, Shell, BP and Chevron to 
gain greater control over Iraqi oil industry."* 
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High Petroleum Product Area 
It should be noted that 90 per cent ofthe world’s oil comes 
out from the sea. High petroleum product countries are 
Nigeria, Iraq, Iran, Russia, Vietnam, Yemen and Libya. 
According to the various reports: Gulf has 66 per cent oil 
reserves,‘Africa has 8 per cent and Caspian Sea has 26‘per 
cent of the world reserves oil. Nigeria has 14 per cent, Africa‘s 
leading exporter of crude oil, is set to increase daily output 
f;om 2.2m to 3m barrels, rising to 4.42m by 2020. In 2002 
Angola, Africa’s second largest producer emerged from 15 
years of civil war and by 2020, expect it to double output to 
3.28m barrels a day. Equatorial Guinea currently holds the 
record (alongside Angola) for oil prospecting permits. Over 
the next 20 years it could become Africa’s third largest 
producer (ahead of Congo and Gabon) with 740,000 barrels 
a day. 
Iraq has the second largest proven oil reserves in the world 
(115 billion barrels) after Saudi Arabia. Certain estimations 
put it as high as 250 billion barrels because more than 90 per 
cent of the underground remains unexplored. This high 
quality crude is easy to transport. Grabbing Iraq’s oil was 
for the USA a major stake and time to take that gamble was 
running out to the deterioration of US-Saudi relations which 
bodes ill for the renewal of the treaty between the two 
countries which will expire in 2005. 
While trying to take control of Iraq’s mineral resources 
however, the Americans were keeping in mind another 
target, even more important than ensuring their own 
supplies. That aim was to gain control of energy sources 
upon which their main rivals, China and Europe, will 
depend for decades to come. 
Such a strategy was naturally accepted to the Bush White 
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House whose major members almost belong to the Texas 
oiI and gas clan. When they don't come from within that 
oligarchy, the members of the current Administration are 
almost without exception representatives of the military- 
industrial complex. At least 32 secretaries and other senor 
staffers are either former board members, consultants or 
shareholders of the largest armament industries and 17 of 
them are connected to the key suppliers of the missile 
defgnse system. 
The New Yo& Tiiiies quotes Roger Diwan, a managing 
director of the Petroleum Finance Company: "'Iliere is a long- 
term strategy from the US government to weaken OPEC's 
hold on the market and one way to do that is to peel off 
certain countries? 
x. 
Top World Oil Consumers, 2002 
Country Total Oil Consumption 










India 2.1 I 
Canada 2.0 , I 
France 2.0 I 
\ 
TubZe irichdes nlZ countries flinf cotrs:mred inore thnn 2 riii!lioii bbyd irr 2002. 
Source: h t t p ; / / i r ~ l w o . e i a . d o r . g o z ~ e i t ~ e u / c n b s / r t i t i ~  
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Production: Current OPEC Members 
- (Million BarrelsDay) 1 
: 
Member Jan. 1990 Dee. 1998 Change 
Algeria 1.2 0.8 -0.4 
Indonesia 1.3 1.4 * -  0.1 
Iran 
Libya 1.2 1.4 
Nigeria 
Qatar . 
Saudi Arabia 5.5 2.6 
U.A.E 2.1 2.2 0.2 
Venezuela 2.0 3.0 1 .o 
Total 23.0 27.4 4.4 
OPEC Facing Two Major Threats 
Since the 1990s, OPEC oil has been facing two major threats. 
One is the use of natural gas in the demand side and the 
other is export from non-OPEC countries from the supply 
side. In the last two decades, the demand for natural gas 
has increased. Previously, natural gas was being used in oil 
producing countries only for their domestic use but when 
oil supplies shrank even the oil consuming countries started 
using gas as an alternative source cf energy. Gas competed 
against oil use in all areas from all soxces but OPEC oil 
was especially affected because of the use of gas in the field 
of road communication. Over the last 20 years, while the 
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production of gas rose by 50 per cent, oil output fell by 25 
per cent? The Asian oil market is largely dependent on the 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and Japan. Saudi Arabia 
is the world’s largest exporter of oil and Japan is the second 
largest importer of oil. In 1985, Japan accounted for about 
42 per cent of all Asia-Pacific oil demand. India and China. 
together accounted for 65 per cent of the rest.5 Also the rate 
of demand growth in India, China and Korea is the largest 
in the world. Since all these countries depend largely on 
OPEC supply, there should not be any harm to the interests 
of OPEC in case of a temporary deadlock with the West. 
However, natural gas is expected to be the fastest growing 
primary energy source over the next two decades, both 
worldwide and in Asia. Consumption of natural gas is stated 
to increase rapidly by nearly 97 per cent in the next two 
decades. Environmental concerns will raise the importance 
of natural gas as a future source of environmentally friendly 
energy. The challenges related to transportation are perhaps 
going to be the mosi acute. 
Asia as a whole will be the world’s largest energy consumer 
by the end of this decade. Asian dependence on oil imports 
is expected to rise to approximately 77 per cent by 2010. 
Most of the hydrocarbon reserves will become increasingly 
concentrated in the Persian Gulf region, which itself is likely 
to get linked to the Caspian region either through pipelines 
or swap arrangements. Asia as a demand heartland and the 
Gulf region as the resource periphery will become 
increasingly interdependent for energy supplies. The Persian 
Gulf will continue to be crucial for energy security and 
stability in the coming decades. But American and European 
dependence on the Gulf is likely to decline. 
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As things stand now, there is no reason to anticipate that 
nuclear power will.make a significant contribution in 
meeting Asia’s growing energy requirements. Nevertheless, 
the use of nuclear energy will increase markedly in energy 
deficient countries of the developing world, especially India 
and China, as they search for diversification ,and self-reliance 
in the energy sector. 
c e  new energy supply relationships may have important 
phitical and national security implications that will affect 
the strategies of some states directly and those of other states 
indirectly. For instance, in South Asia, Myanmar and 
Bangladesh will be central players in regional gas supply, 
which would present India with a number of potentially 
difficult strategic problems. China is already building energy 
relationships worldwide, in Central Asia, Russia, Africa, and 
the Middle East and even in Latin America. 
Asian Gas Consumption 
’ (Trillion cubic feet) 
1 Country 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
I China 0.5 0.6 1.4 2.4 . 3 3.3 3.7 
I India 0.4 0.6 1.5 2.3 2.5 2.9 5.9 1 Japan 2: 2.5 2.8 14.8 3.2 1:; Other 9.4 12.1 18.1 
Developing 
Countries 
Source: EIA, lnternational Energy Outlook 1998, p.137 
Indian Scenario 
India is the six largest oil consumer, and imports 70 per cent 
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of its crude oil of which more than 65 per cent comes from 
the Gulf region. India accounted for 12.5 per cent of total 
primary energy consump tion in the Asia-Pacific region and 
3 per cent of world primary energy consumption in 2000/ 
01.6Per capita energy consumption remains low at 486 KGOE 
(kilograms of oil equivalent) compared with a world average. 
of 1659 KGOE in 1998. Increasing oil and coal imports in 
recect years is an area of concern for the Indian energy sector, 
withnet energy imports increasing from 8 per cent in 1980 
to 13 per cent in 1998.' 
The future consumption will have to be necessarily met by 
imports as the demand for oil is expected to be to 3.2 million 
bbl/d by 2010. Gas consumption too is growing and is likely 
to be 1.2 Tcf in 2005 and 1.6 Tcf in 2010 compared to 0.8 Tcf 
in 2000.8 
Proven reserves of crude oil is 732 million metric tonnes. 
Production is around 33 million tonnes but demand is 
around 107 million'tonnes. The proven natural gas reserve 
is 763 billion cubic metres. Production is 86 million metric 
standard cubic metre per day (MMSCMD), while the 
demand is 115 MMSCMD. Based on the present GDP growth 
rate of 5.5 per cent, the demand for crude oil will be 190 
million tonnes by 2011-12, which will result in 81 per cent 
import dependence. With respect to natural gas, the demand 
will rise to 313 MMSCMD in 2010-12. And though Reliance 
Industries has discovered gas reserves in the Krishna- 
Godavari basin, which has a capacity of 7 trillion cubic feet, 
and the ONGC has also discovered gas reserves in Rajasthan, 
it would take at least 3 to 5 years to reach the consumers by 
which time the demand for natural gas would have increased 
to over 151 MMSCMD? 
The current demand is only 8 per cent of the world average, 
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which is likely to increase to 20 per cent by 2025 due to fuel 
substitution. For example, coal-based thermal powers will 
be expected to convert into gas-based. No doubt, the proven 
coal reserve is around 2,13,905.5 million tonnes but coal as 
an  energy source is environment-unfriendly. As for 
hydroelectricity, India has considerable potential, estimated 
at 84,000 mw. Rivers are important sources of renewable 
energy. But unfortunately, some major projects have sparked 
'controversy. Also, there is poor transmission and 
distribution of electricity resulting in a supply gap of 30 per 
cent. It has been estimated that power shortage may cost 1- 
3 per cent of national income. Although India has ample 
uranium and thorium oxide, due to the high cost of 
production and safety problems, electricity production is 
only around 2.6 per cent. 
Looking at the requirements India has outlined a strategy 
by defining parameters of its hydrocarbon policy in 2025 
time frame, officially called Hydrocarbon Vision 2025. In 
terms of global engagement, the vision promotes linkages 
of long-term nature by signing long-term deals and acquiring 
stakes in overseas projects. It has signed two deals of 25 
duration with Qatar and Iran, respectively. The first 
consignment of 138,000 cubic metres of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) from Qatar has already been received by India. Iran- 
Pakistan-India gas pipeline though still under dispute is 
another initiative that could provide India gas from Iran. 
Besides India is looking at Bangladesh, Myanmar and 
Vietnam. 
' 
Oil and Natural Gas Corp is reportedly planning to invest 
over Rs. 6,000 crore annually in acquiring oil properties 
abroad and is currently in dialogue for buying out stakes in 
oil fields in more than a dozen countries including Australia, 
I34 
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Indonesia and Russia. We havebudgeted more than Rs. 6,000 
crore annually for acquisitions of oil and gas fields abroad. 
ONGC Videsh, ONGC’s overseas investment arm, has 
presence in oil and gas fields in nine countries including 
Vietnam, Russia, Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, US and 
Myanmar and looking for talks for ’stakes in oil properties 
in South America, Central Asia, Australia, Indonesia, Russia 
and k. MiddIe-East.”O 
Taking into account the demand-supply matrix, the three 
Asian players will be actively pursuing their interest in the 
Gulf market. Whether their search will enhance the intensity 
to competition and conflict could be an issue of debate. In 
the changing context where hydrocarbons despite being 
strategic commodity is moving to the arena of market to be 
traded as “just another commodity” the pressure of market 
seems to be prevailing in defining the parameter of emerging 
regime. One plausible scenario could be, Asia’s tremendous 
expansion of energy demand over the next two decades will 
force key regional powers such as India and China to accept 
greater levels of cross-border energy dependency, and this 
will constitute a new cultural mindset for leaders long 
accustomed to viewing energy primarily as a security 
vulnerability. As such, we choose as our pinnacle moment 
the shift from buying natural gas via LNG ships to erecting 
permanent pipelines that create long- term energy 
interdependencies. 
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~ 
2001 4.8 24 0.65 1.37 
2002 5.4 18.3 0.76 1.51 
India, China and Japan; Oil and Gas (Consumption) 
Oil consumption Natural Gas consumption 
(000b/d) (billion cubic metres) 
Year India China Japan India China Japan 
1992 1296 2662 5521 15.3 15.1 11.7 
1993 1313 2913 5440 15.9 16.2 13 
4994 1413 3145 5745 16.6 16.6 13.6 
1995 1533 3390 5784 19.6 17.7 13.7 
1996 1663 3672 5812 20.7 17.7 17.8 
1997 1753 3935 5761 23 19.3 16.7 
1998 1835 4047 5525 24.7 19.3 17.4 
1999 2016 4416 5618 25.9 21.4 16.1 
2000 2067 4985 5576 26.9 24.5 24.3 
2001 2066 5030 5434 27.2 27.8 25.8 
2002 2090 5362 5337 28.2 30.1 27 
Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2003. 
Oil and Gas Reserves of India and China 
I Oil Gas I 
Year India China India China 
1982 3.4 19.5 0.41 0.84 
1992 6 24 0.73 1.4 
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Net Oil Imports from the Persian Gulf region 
As % of Demand As YO of Total Net 
Oil Imports 
USA Western Japan USA Western Japan 
Europe Europe 
11.3 29 66 27.4 45 65 
8.8 . 23 70 19.8 44 70 
12.6 21 75 23.8 42 75 
13.9 18 76 25 33 76 
13.9 15 73 21.7 29 75 
Sotirct-: EIA, International Energy Uutfook 2003 
Supply Side Policies 
Traditional energy planning in India has focused largely on 
supply side policies. The entire planning exercise and the 
strategy of public investment in the energy sector was almost 
exclusively focused on creating new supplies of energy, 
assuming that all supplies would be matched by rising 
demand. It has been argued that this policy was pursued at 
the expense of neglecting the cost dimension." What was 
the element of this conceptual framework? First, the 
framework assumed the energy sector to be 'non-tradeable.*l 
Kelkar suggests that this assumption had consequences for 
choice of technology, encouraging capital-intensive 
technologies, and discouraged the possibilities of inter-fuel 
substitution. 
Second, it was assumed that market failures were ubiquitous 
and this required government intervention and public 
ownership of supply. Consequently, says, Kelkar, in leading 
energy sectors, that is coal, power, hydrocarbons and nuclear 
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power, the public sector dominated, and it still holds a 
monopoly position. The rigidities on the supply side then 
contributed to cost escalation and scarcity, and to reduced 
efficiency in utilisation of energy. This approach also 
encouraged investment in coal mining and coal-based 
technologies, irrespective of the economic and environment 
costs, because it was a resource available in abundance 
domestically. - 
A third consequence was the use of energy policy as an 
instrument of macroeconomic policy, to redistribute incomes 
and cross-subsidise consump tion. The extensive use of 
energy subsidy as an instrument of income transfer created 
huge problems of utility bankruptcy, inefficiency in 
transmission and distribution, and generated economy-wide 
losses. 
r, 
Finally, as a result of extensive governmental interference 
in energy generation, nationwide policies were evolved 
across the subcontinent without giving enough policy- 
making freedom to different states to enable them to address 
their energy needs in accordance with their resource 
endowment. 
To add to these policy induced problems is the managerial 
inefficiency of most state electricity boards (SEBs), which 
are run like government departments, often seen as social 
welfare instruments, and not as commercial undertakings. 
The inefficiencies of SEBs have also contributed to supply 
side distortions. 
' 
This entire approach did help increase energy supply 
substantially, but it did not help ensure cost effectiveness 
nor did it ensure supply-demand balance. Further, policies 
were not put in place to stabilise supply-demand imbalances, 
as, for instance, in the form of peak-hour pricing. It is to 
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address these problems that major reforms have been 
initiated in the energy sector. These reforms seek to introduce 
an open economy, treating energy as tradeable; this places 
greater reliance on capital markets for investment allocation, 
giving private investment a larger role and encourages 
investment in new technologies as well as energy-saving 
technologies. 
Domestic Policy Options 
The most important and urgent priority for India to address 
its energy security concerns is to get its domestic policy 
framework right. Without reform of internal policy, it will 
not be possible to address the external security challenge in 
the energy sector. The critical issues relate to pricing, 
efficiency of generation and distribution, and productivity 
of existing investment. In focusing on new projects, 
compelling policy issues need to be addressed with respect 
to making existing investment productive and sustainable. 
Given the trends in world oil prices and the increasing 
pressures of demand in the oil market from China and other 
developing industrialising economies, India can not make 
the transition to a deregulated energy market and dismantle 
the administered price mechanism, allowing integration of 
the home market with the international market, without 
addressing the issue of energy pricing and the problem of 
the oil pool deficit. 
Fiscal reforms, elimination of the oil pool deficit and its full 
integration into the general deficit are essential to energy 
sector deregulation. Such deregulation is required if the 
domestic market has to be integrated with the world market. 
The recent decline in public investment in thermal and 
hydro-electricity must be reversed. This is central to any 
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policy on energy security for India without developing its 
nuclear energy potential. These are important policy choices 
which have to be made. Apart from such choices in 
generation, there are important choices to be made in 
utilisation, on the side of conservation of energy, investment 
in energy saving technologies and in non-conventional 
energy sources critical to energy security. 
Indian Strategy for Energy Security 
In the mainstream discussion on energy security 
management, a neglected dimension is the organisation of 
business and corporate strategy. The government played an 
important role in the past in creating large corporate entities 
with global size and competence in the energy sector. In the 
recent trend towards privatisation and the neglect of the 
public sector, the public sector energy companies should not 
become victims of neglect. The requirements of energy 
security as well as of national interest suggest that public 
sector oil and gas companies should be strengthened, made 
autonomous and free of political interference and 
bureaucratic delays in their regular functioning. Excessive 
bureaucracy has prevented companies like Oil and Natural 
Gas Corporation (ONGC), Gas Authority of India Limited 
(GAIL) and the other petroleum companies from playing a 
more effective role at the global level. Opportunities to invest 
abroad, to acquire oil equity and to undertake projects at 
home have been missed due to a range of political and 
administrative constraints on the functioning of these 
companies. Even as India develops large private sector 
companies in the oil and gas sector, as it should, it must 
strengthen existing public sector companies so that Indian 
corporates are able to compete more effectively with western 
multinationals. 
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Exxon’s plans to “ do&ate the new age of oil exploration.”12 
As this news report sums up: “There is no question that 
Exxon’s insistence on doing things its way breeds conflict 
almost everywhere it goes. But this is one American 
company capable of a continuity of approach and a tenacity 
of purpose that makes even the instittitions of government 
seem transitory by comparison.’’ 
I d a  is capable of building its own oil and gas 
multinationals, as indeed China has been trying to. In 
defining our strategy for energy security, it is important that 
we pay adequate attention to this dimension of industrial 
and ’corporate policy, often neglected in the discussion on 
the issue. 
The External Dimension 
This pertains mainly to security of energy supply, the 
security of sea lanes of communication and of land-based 
and undenva ter pipelines, security of supply contracts, 
insurance against extreme price fluctuations, investment in 
oil equity and, finally, issues pertaining to environmental 
security and the ecological dimension of energy security and 
global inequities in energy consumption. 
India‘s misforhme is that while oil and gas have been found 
in abundance in the entire area around the Indian 
subcontinent, from the Persian Gulf to South East Asia, 
India’s own reserves of oil and gas are rather limited. Hence, 
India’s import dependence is bound to increase in the years 
to come. By the year 2010, India’s import dependence in 
crude oil is expected to touch 80 per cent and in natural gas 
77 per cent.13 Supplies are expected largely from the Persian 
Gulf, but India has been diverslfylng its portfolio of suppliers 
and investing in oil equity across the world. 
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While a more diversified portfolio of suppliers is good, the 
fact remains that the bulk of India’s requirements will come 
from its neighbourhood, including the Gulf, Iran, Central 
Asia, South East Asia and Bangladesh. Long-term strategies, 
therefore, require stabilising these supplies and ensuring the 
security of these supplies and supply routes. 
The objective of stabilising supplies requires a diversification 
of source and ensuring the security of key source. Several 
policy options exist, ranging from investing in oil equity, 
building up adequate strategic oil reserves, entering into- 
long-term and future contracts, investing in the required 
infrastructure to handle the throughput from source to 
destination and, finally, assurance of the security of supplies 
within the country as well as between the source country 
and the destination. These objectives will have to be met by 
a combination of policy instruments ranging from investing 
in the materials handling infrastntcture, ports and storage 
facilities to further empowering the naval forces and coast 
guards to improve policing of sea lanes and coast lines. 
The energy sector, it is now clear, would require major 
infusion of capital from the private sector, both from 
domestic as well as international sources. 
-_ 
The derating of the Indian economy by Moody’s as well as 
some of the aforementioned restrictions would certainly 
raise questions about the cost of capital and the volume of 
flow that canbe expected. Yet, there are no strong indications 
at present that the Indian energy sector has gone off the radar 
screen of investors throughout the world. This has to be seen 
also in the context of the crisis that is enveloping the rest of 
Asia. Since growth and demand for energy, and therefore 
for new capacity in most of South East Asia is much lower 
at the moment, India becomes a more attractive destination 
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for investments. However, it is important that the 
government not only puts in place a more liberal set of 
policies, but also installs processes and structures by which 
decision-making can become speedier and more investor- 
friendly. 
The establishment of a Central Electricity Regulatory 
Commission (CERC) is indeed a step in the right direction. 
Two *tates, namely Orissa and Haryana, have also 
established independent regulatory commissions, and 
several others are likely to follow suit in the near future. In 
the hydrocarbons sector, the government is making efforts 
to clearly define and make known its New Exploration 
Licensing Policy (NELP). Some efforts are also being made, 
though not with a great deal of speed and vigour, in the 
coal sector. 
All these developments need to be seen against a wide 
canvas, which apart from the traditional concerns linked 
with energy policy, also take into account the important issue 
of energy security. It seems somewhat surprising that after 
almost a decade and a half of relative stability in global oil 
prices and a sigruficant glut of crude oil in the world market, 
the issue of energy security should surface again. Much of 
this arises on account of several developments that have 
taken place recently. 
Firstly, the demand for energy in Asia has been growing 
rapidly, and since South, South East, and East Asia are net 
importers of energy, anything that happens in this expanded 
region does affect the level of energy security. Even though 
the current recession and economic problems afflicting the 
region would slow down gr0wth.h demand, there is every 
reason to believe that growth will be resumed in the not- 
too-distant future. When that happens, concerns about 
energy security would surface again. 
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Another major development has been the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, resulting in the birth of the republics of Central 
Asia, which are rich in hydrocarbon resources. The vacuum 
created by the withdrawal of Russian influence from these 
republics has led to rivalry among several countries which 
have been attempting to gain access and control over these 
resources in recent years. Issues of security emerge from 
these developments as well. 
Another important factor arises out of the long-term change, 
which is taking place on the supply side of the international 
oil market. With the prospect of declining reserves in other 
parts of the world, the Gulf region is likely to emerge with a 
much larger share of global oil supplies than in the past. 
This would raise concern about energy security on account 
of the vulnerability of this region to political upheavals as 
well as the concentration of supply routes emanating out of 
the region, which could make them a target of hostilities, 
terrorism, piracy, and other forms of misguided actions and 
mischief. 
One set of projections for energy supply in India in the future 
is provided in Table 1. 
Energy in Electricity Generated 
It would be observed from the figures projected that oil 
demand and supply would almost quadruple during the 
period 1990 and 2020. However, based on current indications 
of increases in indigenous production, the level of imports 
in the same period would increase to eight times the 1990 
levels. This poses a major challenge not only in terms of 
ensuring a diversification of sources to minimise the 
possibility of disruptions in supply arising out of various 
factors but also in terms of ensuring that the lifeline of supply 
remains uninterrupted. Analysts are not particularly 
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Table1 : Primary Energy Supply: Baseline Scenario (PJ) 
1 1990 2000 2010 2020 
Coal 3850 7145 10508 15516 
Indigenous 3850 7145 10508 15167 
Imports - - - 349 
Oil 2416 4245 7553 10723 
I Indigenous 1410 1592 1774 1955 
I hpo r t s  1006 2653 5759 8768 1 
Gas 480 1002 1909 3478 
Indigenous 480 1000 667 533 
Imports - 2 1242 2945 
Hydro* 249 324 625 917 
Nuclear 24 31 25 12 
Total 
commercial 
energy 7019 12747 20600 30646 
Crop residue 763 * 763 763 763 
Fuelw ood 3134 3134 3134 3134 
Animal waste 1314 1227. 1113 939 
Tot a1 
traditional 
energy . 5211 5124 5010 4836 
Source: Basic Statistics on Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas New Delhi: MoPNG, 
Government of India, 2002. 
concerned about the possibility of large-scale hostilities 
disrupting the supply of oil physically, but the dangers of 
terrorist actions in several spots could create serious 
repercussions for major importers of oil such as India. 
Another major concern, of course, arises out of larger 
changes that could take place in the global oil market. This 
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would really be in the nature of sudden fluctuations inprices, 
such as those that were experienced in 1973-74 and 1979-80. 
More recently, at the start of this decade, the Gulf War 
resulted in nervousness and sudden price increase in the 
world market, which for a major oil importer like India 
would have serious economic impacts if repeated. .~ 
The challenge of energy security requires consideration on 
various fronts. While many actions have to be taken - e.g., 
efforts at a more purposeful policy for production of 
hydrocarbons would help - a much larger view of economic 
initiatives and actions would serve India’s interests far 
better. 
Firstly, overall economic policy has to accept the reality that 
the scarcity of commercial energy resources and oil, in 
particular, in India is an important factor which should 
influence the structure of the Indian economy. Consequently, 
continuing the expansion of activities that are highly energy 
intensive needs careful considera tion, whereby a preference 
for imports rather than local manufacture would be 
desirable. In essence, energy security would be ensured by 
replacing oil imports at the margin with imports of oil- or 
energy-using products instead. 
At another level, fuel substitution initiatives which reduce 
dependence on oil imports and favour greater use of 
indigenous energy resources should be preferred. Some of 
these changes would occur naturally if there is an import 
premium attached to prices of crude oil and oil products. 
However, this would presuppose efficiency and market 
responsive supply of other forms of energy. This, 
unfortunately, is not the case. In fact, in the case of electricity 
supply, given the enormous problems in the state electricity 
boards, failures of supply lead to the installation of captive 
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power generation units using large quantities of petroleum 
products. This is also h i e  in the case of diesel pumpsets 
that are used in preference to electric pumpsets in niral areas, 
which generally receive very poor quality power. 
Macro policies and market-based instruments should be 
used effectively for ensuring high levels of energy security 
as mentioned above. There is also a need for institutional 
initiatives and innovation such as empowering pnnchnyts  
and municipal bodies for effective decisions and actions in 
the energy sector. Efforts to improve the efficiency of energy 
use, conversion of waste material into useful energy, and 
the installation of renewable energy devices would only take 
place if local institutions are strong enough to bring about a 
change in these directions. The 73rd and 74th Amendments 
to the Constitution of India provided the framework and 
rationale for involving local institutions in development 
decisions and actions. However, very little follow-up has 
taken place in terms of providing local bodies with abilities 
to take effective action. Governments at the centre and the 
states need to urgently build capacity in local instit~itions 
for attaining an energy path which is sustainable and 
relevant for the endowment of resources at the local level. 
Combined with rational pricing of electricity, local 
initiatives, particularly in rural areas, can reduce our 
dependence overall on growing imports of oil and oil 
products. 
India has implemented a series of policy changes since the 
mid-1990s to encourage foreign investment. Tariffs on 
imported capital goods have been lowered, and in some 
cases eliminated (such as equipment for largescale power 
generation projec ts). Restrictions on foreign ownership have 
been relaxed. Previously, foreign ownership had been 
limited to a minority ownership stake. Now, in many sectors, 
I 47 
 at Universiti Utara Malaysia on November 3, 2014iqq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Akhilesh Cliaitdra Prabhakar 
majority foreign ownership is permitted. In some areas, 
however, reform has been slow - particularly the energy 
sector. Electricity consumption is still supported by heavy 
subsidies, and the formal end of the Administered Pricing 
Mechanism (APM) for petroleum products in April 2002 did 
not completely end government controls on petroleum 
product prices. Annual foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
India has hovered in the range of $3-4 billion over the last 
:several years, though, compared to roughly SO billion per 
year of FDI in China.I4 
Oil 
Oil accounts for about 30 per cent of India‘s total energy 
consumption. The majority of India’s roughly 5.4 billion 
barrels in oil reserves are located in the Bombay High, Upper 
Assam, Cambay, Krisha-Godavari, and Cauvery basins. The 
offshore Bombay High field is by far India’s largest 
producing field, with production of 203,000 barrels per day 
(bbl/d) in 2001. India’s average oil production level (total 
liquids) for 2002 was 759,000 bbl/d. India had net oil imports 
of over 1.2 million bbl/d in 2002. 
Future oil consumption in India is expected to grow rapidly, 
to 3.2 million bbl/d by 2010, from 2.0 million bbl/d in 2002. 
India is attempting to limit its dependence on oil imports 
somewhat by expanding domestic exploration and 
production. To this end, the Indian government is pursuing 
the New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP), first 
announced in 1997, which permits foreign involvement in 
exploration, an activity long restricted to Indian stateowned 
firms. While the initial response to the 1999 tender was 
disappointing, with no bids received from the major 
multinational oil companies (causing an extension of the 
deadline for submission of bids), India proceeded with the 
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award of 25 oil exploration blocks in early January 2000. The 
largest winner in the bidding round was India’s domestic 
Reliance Industries, in partnership with independent Niko 
Resources of Canada, which received 12 blocks. British 
independent Cairn Energy, Russia’s Gazprom, the US firm 
Mosbacher Energy, and Geopetrol of France were all. 
awarded single blocks in partnership with Indian firms. 
India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation 
(ONGC) was awarded eight blocks, three of which it will 
hold in partnership with other public-sector Indian firms. 
A second round of bidding, with a total of 25 blocks offered, 
concluded in March 2001. Sixteen of the blocks have been 
awarded to ONGC, and four blocks to Hardy Oil of the 
United Kingdom, in partnership with India’s Reliance 
Petroleum. The others were either awarded to smaller 
independent firms or failed to receive bids. As with the first 
round, no bids were received from major international oil 
companies. Bids for the third round were received in August 
2002, with a total of 27 blocks offered. Awards under this 
third round were made in February 2003, with domestic 
Indian firms receiving most of the blocks. Reliance Industries 
received nine offshore blocks, one adjacent to the Krishna- 
Godavari Basin. ONGC was awarded 13 blocks, five offshore 
and eight onshore. The Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation 
received one. 
Low drilling recovery rates are a major part of the oil supply 
problem for India. Recovery rates average only around 30 
per cent in currently producing Indian fields, well below 
the world average. It is hoped that allowing foreign 
investment will bring in technology that is not available to 
Indian state firms, thereby increasing overall recovery rates. 
ONGC currently is undertaking a project to increase recovery 
rates in the Bombay High offshore field and several others, 
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aiming to boost the overall recovery rate for its production 
assets from 28 per cent to 40 per cent. Recent experience 
does not support an optimistic view about India’s prospects 
for a sharp increase in oil production as no major new finds 
have been made in recent years. Analysts consider it likely 
that most of India’s easily recoverable oil has-been 
discovered. The main cause for hope is offshore exploration, 
and in particular deep water exploration. One onshore area 
which also has shown promise is western Rajasthan, and a 
small find was reported in early 2001 by Cairn Energy 
offshore from Gujarat which is believed to hold about 200 
million barrels of recoverable reserves. Most recent drilling, 
however, has found natural gas rather than crude oil. 
British Gas purchased a 30 per cent stake in the Panna, 
Mukta, and Tapti offshore oil and gas fields in February 2002, 
which had previously been held by Enron. A dispute 
between Britsh Gas and ONGC, which owns a 40 per cent 
interest in the fields, over which firm would operate them 
was resolved in February 2003 with a joint operatorship 
agreement. Reliance Industries holds the other 30 per cent 
stake. 
Downst ream/Ref i n i ng 
For most of the 199Os, India imported a large quantity of 
refined products, lacking the refining capacity to keep up 
with growing demand. In 1999, refinery construction 
allowed India to close the gap, At the end of 2002, India had 
a total of 2.1 million bbl/d in refining capacity, an increase 
of 970,000 bbl/d since 1998. In late summer 1999, Reliance 
Petroleum’s huge Jamnagar refinery came onstream. It has 
since reached its full capacity of 540,000 bbl/d. Jamnagar 
does not have its own retail distribution network, but sells 
its product through three of the state-owned firms. It plans 
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to build a retail network of its own in coming years. Refinery 
construction has been encouraged by regulatory changes by 
the Indian government, including a five-year tax holiday 
for refineries completed by 2003. 
Another major downstream infrastructure development is 
the construction of pipelines being undertaken by Petronet 
India, a company created by an agreement in 1998 between 
Inea’s state-owned refineries, which will add 500,000 bbl/ 
d to India’s current 325,000 bbl/d capacity for pipeline 
transportation of refined products. Pipelines between 
refineries and major urban centres are replacing rail as the 
main mode of transportation. 
While retail gasoline sales are still controlled by state firms, 
several multinationals have entered the Indian lubricants 
market, which was deregulated five years ago. Over one- 
third of the market is currently held by such firms as Shell, 
Exxon Mobil, and Caltex. While these operations are 
relatively small, they are seenas allowing the majors to study 
the Indian market, establish brand recognition, and prepare 
for the eventual deregulation of the Indian retail petroleum 
products sector. Still, a requirement that foreign firms invest 
at least $400 million before entering the downstream market 
has served to limit their entry into petroleum products 
retailing. 
Industry Restructuring and Price Deregulation 
The Indian government officially ended the Administered 
Pricing Mechanism (APM) for petroleum product prices in 
April 2002. Prior to this deregulation, the Indian government 
had tried to offset the effects of price changes in crude oilby 
maintaining an Oil Pool Account, which was to build 
financial reserves when crude oil prices fell and release them 
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back as increased subsidies when crude oil prices rose. In 
practice, though, the April 2002 reforms have not completely 
removed government influence on petroleum product 
prices. Subsidies have been maintained on some products, 
such as kerosene, which is commonly used as a cooking fuel 
by low-income households in India. S tate-owned 
downstream companies also still must submit proposed 
price changes to the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas 
‘for approval. There have been some indications that this 
approval process has been used in late 2002 and early 2003 
to curb increases in petroleum product prices as crude oil 
prices have risen. 
After an extended delay due to internal policy debates, the 
Indian government announced a decision in December 2002 
to sell off majority stakes in two of the largest state-owned 
downstream oil companies, Hindustan Petroleum (HPCL) 
and Bharat Petroleum (BPCL). HPCL is slated to be sold off 
to a ‘strategic’ buyer - another major oil company. BPCL‘s 
shares will be bffered through a public stock offering. The 
Indian government currently owns 51 per cent of HPCL and 
66 per cent of BPCL. The divestments are planned for the 
second half of 2003. 
- 
Natural Gas 
Indian consumption of natural gas has risen faster than any 
other fuel in recent years. From only 0.6 trillion cubic feet 
(Tcf) per year in 1995, natural gas use was nearly 0.8 Tcf in 
2000 and is projected to reach 1.2 Tcf in 2005 and 1.6 Tcf in 
2010. A major development in December 2002 was the 
announcement by Reliance Industries of its discovery of a 
large amount of natural gas in the Krishna-Godavari Basin 
offshore from Andhra Pradesh along India’s southeast coast. 
New reserves from this find are estimated at about 5 Tcf. 
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Cairn Energy also reported finds in late 2002 offshore from 
Andhra Pradesh as well as Gujarat, which contain reserves 
estimated at nearly 2 Tcf. 
Even with these new reserves, India’s domestic natural gas 
supply is not likely to keep pace with demand, and the .. 
country will have to import much of its natural gas, either 
via pipeline or as LNG. The main market impacts from the 
new fiqds will be on India’s east coast, which currently lacks 
extensive natural gas infrastructure. While EIA’s current 
forecast in the International Energy Ouloook 2002 predicts 
a 6.1 per cent annual growth rate innatural gas consumption, 
this reflects a substantial downward revision from previous 
forecasts, which had projected consumption of 2.7 Tcf per 
year by 2010. Problems with financing LNG import projects 
have dimmed some of the previous prospects for explosive 
growth in natural gas consumption in India, and helped to 
revive interest in pipeline import options. Financial 
problems in the power sector, the main consumer of natural 
gas, also have had a negative effect. 
Most of India’s current natural gas production takes place 
in the Bombay High basin and the state of Gujarat. Current 
projects include enhancing natural gas production at the 
Tapti fields and recovering previously flared natural gas at 
the Bombay High oilfield. 
India is investing heavily in the infrastructure reqGed to 
support increased use of natural gas. Gas Authority of India 
Limited (GAIL), a government-owned entity, is in the 
process of doubling the throughput capacity on its main 
Hazira-Bijaipur-Jagdishpur (HBJ) Pipeline. Work on the 
capacity expansion began in 2002, and will eventually raise 
the capacity of the line from about 1.1 billion cubic feet per 
day (Bcf/d) to 2.1 Bcf/d. GAIL also plans a new distribution 
153 
 at Universiti Utara Malaysia on November 3, 2014iqq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Akltilesli Chandra Prabhakar 
network in West Bengal and a pipeline which would connect 
Calcutta with Chennai. Shell has signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the state government of Uttar Pradesh 
in northern India for the development of a natural gas 
distribution infrastructure. 
India’s Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) had 
approved 12 prospective LNG import terminal projects in 
the mid-to:late-l990s, but it was never considered likely that 
all would be built in the near future, as their combined 
capacity would have exceeded even the most optimistic 
demand projections. The Indian government froze approvals 
of new LNG terminals in 2001, and payment problems at 
the Enron-backed Dabhol Power Plant in Maharashtra have 
led many to question the financial viability of some of the 
LNG import projects. Since the main consumers of the 
imported gas would be power producers, the poor financial 
condition of most of the state power boards which purchase 
power and run the transmission grids is likely to be a major 
constraint OA the development of LNG imports. 
The largest state sector projects are to be conducted by 
Petronet, a joint venture between ONGC, IOC, the Gas 
Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL), the National Thermal Power 
Corporation (NTPC), and Gaz de France. Under the current 
plan, each of the state firms would own a 10 per cent stake, 
the Gujarat state government will own 5 per cent, and the 
rest will be offered to private investors, possibly including 
an equity stake for Qatar’s RasGas, the main supplier of LNG 
for the project. Petronet plans two import terminals, one at 
Dahej and the other at Cochin. The import terminal at Dahej 
currently is under construction, and is expected to be 
completed in late 2003. RasGas is to begin supplying LNG 
to Petronet when the Dahej terminal is completed. 
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The Dahej terminal has had advantages over some of the 
other proposed projects, b-eing tied in with the main state- 
owned natural gas company, GAIL, and the existing HBJ 
pipeline network. It is unclear whether sufficient demand 
will exist to support a planned 2007 completion date for the 
Cochin import terminal. 
Shell also has begun construction of its LNG import terminal 
at Hazes in Gujarat, and has contracted for LNG supplies 
from Oman. The facility is scheduled to begin operation in 
2005. Like the Petronet Dahej terminal, it is to be linked into 
existing nahrral gas pipelines. 
The Dabhol LNG terminal was nearly finished at the time 
construction was halted in June 2001, and it will likely be 
completed by another firm once a buyer is found for the 
now-bankrupt Enron’s 65 per cent share of the project. Two 
other American firms involved in the project, General 
Electric and Bechtel, which each now own 10 per cent, are 
reported to be in the final stages of negotiations to acquire 
the stake formerly held by Enron. 
In the wake of the problems with Dabhol, firms backing 
several other LNG projects pulled out in the second half of 
2001. Dakshin Bharat Energy, a consortium including CMS 
Energy and Unocal, also announced the cancellation of its 
planned LNG project at Ennore. TotalFinaElf has suspended 
further action on its planned LNG import terminal a t  
Trombay. These LNG projects were cancelled largely in 
response to the Indian government’s decision not to extend 
sovereign payment guarantees to power projects which were 
to have been among their largest customers. Another 
proposed project at Kakinada on India’s east coast may be 
jeopardised by cheaper natural gas supplies which will 
become available once Reliance Industries new offshore 
finds are developed. 
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Aside from LNG imports, imports of natural gas by pipeline 
may play a role eventually in satisfying India’s gas needs. 
One possibility would supply India with natural gas from 
Iran‘s huge South Pars field via a pipeline, either subsea or 
through Pakistan. Iran has discussed the proposal with India 
and Pakistan. Australia’s Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP) is 
the main foreign backer of the idea. An offshore route 
bypassing Pakistan is under study by Snamprogetti of Italy. 
Pakistan had said in early 2001 that it would allow supplies 
to cross its territory, and Iran would bear the contractual 
responsibility for assuring gas supplies to India, but the 
project does not appear likely to be implemented in the near 
future due to the obvious security concerns for India. 
Another possible import route would link the natural gas 
reserves of Bangladesh into the Indian gas grid. Current 
proven reserves of natural gas in Bangladesh are at least 14 
Tcf, but the foreign firms involved in natural gas exploration 
in Bangladesh, which includes Unocal, believe that reserves 
are higher. Shell, whichbacks exports to India, has estimated 
Bangladeshi natural gas reserves at 38 Tcf, and a study by 
the US Geological Survey put the country’s probable reserves 
at 32 Tcf. Bangladesh has been reluctant to approve exports 
to India, however, until all questions about reserves and its 
domestic supply have been resolved. Shell reportedly has 
been in negotiations with Unocal about possible imports of 
Bangladeshi gas for its distribution projects in Uttar Pradesh, 
and Unocal made a formal proposal to the Bangladeshi 
government for gas exports in October 2001. As of February 
2003, the Bangladeshi government is still considering the 
idea, and has not reached a final decison. The new natural 
gas reserves discovered off Andhra Pradesh in 2002 could 
compete with imports from Bangladesh, thus increasing the 
pressure to reach a decision in the near fuhue. 
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India’s government has been considering reforms in its 
natural gas pricing mechanism, which is currently set by 
the government. Deregulation has been delayed several 
times, and the recent increase in domestic reserves may lead 
to a tilt toward less regulation of prices, making LNG 
importers compete with domestic natural gas suppliers. 
Coal 
Coal is the dominant commercial fuel in India, satisfying 
more than half of India’s energy demand. Power generation 
accounts for about 70 per cent of India‘s coal consumption, 
followed by heavy industry. Coal consumption is projected 
in the International Energy Annual 2002 to increase to 450 
million short tonnes (Mmst) in 2010, up from 369 million 
short tonnes in 2000. This is a substantial increase in the 
rate of growth projected in previous forecasts. India is the 
world’s third largest coal producer (after China and the 
United States), so.most of the country’s coal demand is 
satisfied by domestic supplies. Indian coal generally has a 
high ash content and low calorific value, so most coking 
coal must be imported. Major Indian coal fields are found 
in Bihar, West Bengal, and Madhya Pradesh.15 
The Indian government controls almost all coal production, 
which has been plagued by low productivity, distribution 
problems, and loss of markets to higher quality, less 
expensive imports. Nearly all of India’s 390 mines are under 
Coal India Ltd. (CL), which accounts for about 90 per cent 
of the Country’s coal production. Current policy allows 
private mines only if they are ’captive’ operations which 
feed a power plant or factory. The current government has 
called off plans for further coal-sector liberalisation in the 
face of strong opposition from labow unions. 
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Electricity 
India is trying to expand electric power generation capacity, 
as current generation is seriously below peak demand. 
Although about 80 per cent of the population has access to 
electricity, power outages are common, and the unreliability 
of electricity supplies is severe enough to constitute a 
constraint on the country’s overall economic development. 
The goverriment had targeted capacity increases of 100,000 
’ megawatts (W) over the next ten years. As of January 2001, 
total installed Indian power generating capacity was 112,000 
MW. 
The drive to increase the country’s generating capacity, along 
with the general trend toward economic liberalisation in 
India in the 199Os, led to much interest among foreign 
investors in setting up Independent Power Producers (IPPs) 
in India. While dozens of projects were approved, most of 
the larger projects have been stalled by delays in regulatory 
approvals and in some cases failure to secure adequate 
financing. India’s state electricity boards (SEB’s), which run 
the power distribution infrastructure and own most current 
generating capacity, are in very poor financial shape, with 
many of them technically insolvent. One reason is the sale 
of power at subsidised rates, which does not cover costs 
(particularly in the agricultural sector). Other problems 
include the high level of transmission and distribution losses 
and widespread power theft. Since the SEBs would be the 
main purchasers of power from IPP projects, resolving their 
financial problems is critical to attracting the capital 
necessary to ensure the country develops an adequate 
supply of electric power. 
While India currently does not have a unified national power 
grid, the country plans to link the SEB grids eventually, and 
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has set up a state company, Powergrid, to oversee the 
unification. India also pla& to establish national and state 
level regulatory bodies to set tariffs and promote 
competition. 
In July 1998, the Indian government announced an easing 
of rules related to foreign investment in the power sector. 
Proposals for investments up to Rs 15 billion (about $350 
million)%nvolving up to 100 per cent foreign equity now 
will be approved automatically. Automatic approval will 
be given for investments in generation or distribution from 
hydroelectric, coal, lignite, oil, or gas power plants, but not 
for nuclear plants and associated distribution networks. The 
earlier policy had allowed for only up to 74 per cent foreign 
equity. Still, the financial problems of the SEBs have 
prevented substantial foreign investment from flowing into 
India’s electric power sector. 
India’s government approved a large number of ’mega- 
projects’, defined as plints with capacity of more than 1,000 
MW for thermal plants and more than 500 MW for 
hydroelectric plants, from the mid-to-late-l990s, but project 
approvals have often not led to construction. The 740-MW 
initial phase of the Dabhol LNG-fired power plant began 
operation in May 1999, and Phase 11, which would add 1,440- 
M W  of capacity, is about 90 per cent complete. Payment 
problems with the Maharashtra State Electricity Board 
(MSEB), however, prompted Enron-backed Dabhol Power 
Corporation (DPC) to serve notice of breach of contract on 
MSEB in May 2001. Construction on Phase I1 was halted in 
June 2001. General Electric and Bechtel, each of which own 
. 10 per cent stakes in DPC, have reportedly been negotiating 
in recent months for the purchase of the 65 per cent stake 
held by the now-bankrupt Enron, as wdll as payment 
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Due to the financial problems of the SEBs, a large number 
of foreign firms cancelled or delayed power generation 
projects in India between 1999 and 2001: 
> m  
8 
The largest of the power projects which had obtained 
government approval, the $5-billion, 3,960-MW coal- 
fired Hirma Power Plant, was canceIed by-Mirant 
Corporation in December 2001. 
A 1,040-Mw coal-fired plant at Vishakapatnam was 
planned by Hinduja Power and National Power (UK). 
In June 2001, however, the Industrial Development Bank 
of India (IDBI) announced that it was withdrawing its 
loan to the project, throwkg its future into doubt. 
Electricite de France has quit the coal-fired, 1072-MW 
Bhadrawati project in Maharashtra state. 
The 1,886-MW LNG-fired unit a t  Ennore, with an 
associated LNG import terminal, was canceled by CMS 
Energy .in June 2001. CMS Energy also announced in 
October 2001 that it was pulling out of several smaller 
projects. 
India’s National Thermal Power Company was planning 
a 2,000-MW LNG-fired plant at Pipavav, but the project 
has been shelved after BG withdrew from the LNG 
import terminal project in June 2001. 
Powergrid was planning a 1,320-MW coal-fired plant 
planned for Cuddalore, which was delayed indefinitely 
in early 2001. 
Cogentrix cancelled the 1,000-MW Mangalore coal-fired 
project in December 1999. 
South Korea’s Daewoo Power and ABB Lummus 
cancelled plans for a 1,400-MW plant in Madhya 
Pradesh in August 2000. 
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The DPC controversy is seen by many analysts as a test case 
for India’s power sector, as it has demonstrated the lack of 
creditworthiness of the SEBs. The Dabhol plant, valued at 
$2.9 billion, is the largest single foreign investment in India. 
No major foreign-owned projects have been launched in the 
past year. 
The Indian government is attempting to implement reforms 
which would increase the financial sfxength of the SEBs in 
an attempt to attract capital back to electricity generation 
projects. New legislation on power sector reform was 
approved by the Indian cabinet in February 2002, and is to 
be introduced in Parliament. 
Environment 
The twin issues of population growth and urbanisation 
present a major challenge to India’s environment. A 
combination of increased vehicular ownership and untreated 
industrial smoke has  created a hazardous air pollution 
problem in India’s booming metropolises, and continued 
urbanisation is raising the risks to human health. Several of 
India’s largest cities are ranked among the most polluted in 
the world. An inability to implement and enforce policies 
geared to mitigate smog and other sources of air pollution 
has only exacerbated the problem. 
Owing to population growth and economic development, 
India’s energy consumption has been increasing at one of 
the fastest rates in the world. India’s heavy reliance on coal 
has mean that the country‘s carbon emissions are rising at a 
similar rate. India is a a non-Annex I country under the 
United Nations FrameworkConvention on Climate Change, 
meaning it is not obligated to reduce its emissions of carbon 
and greenhouse gases (GHG). Although Trtdia recognises 
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the importance of reducing these harmful emissions, the 
Indian government also places a high priority on its 
economic development, and India’s carbon emissions are 
projected to continue to rise in the coming decade.lb 
The industrial production that has driven India’s economic 
growth has also prevented the co~mtry from lowering its 
energy intensity (energy consumption per dollar of gross 
domestic product, GDP), while continued dependence on 
coal for the purpose of electricity generation means that India 
has one of the highest levels of carbon intensity (carbon 
emissions per dollar of GDP) in Asia. The Indian government 
is increasingly turning to renewable energy, however, to 
meet the country’s growing energy consumption needs. 
Despite government-promoted plans to increase the use of 
more environmentally-friendly energy sources like solar 
power and hydroelectricity, the environmental outlook for 
India looks negative unless Indian policymakers can tackle 
the problem of providing increasing amounts of energy to a 
rapidly growing populace in an environmentally-sustainable 
fashion. 
Conclusion 
India imports 65 per cent of its energy sources from the 
Persian Gulf. But this region is volatile. Besides the Gulf 
region, India can get energy sources from the Caspian region, 
South-East Asia, Australia, Africa and Europe. But in the 
Caspian region, existing reserves are much lower than what 
was estimated, they are land-locked and the current pipeline 
. infrastructure is grossly unsatisfactory. 
Major South East Asian countries such as Malaysia and 
Indonesia are going to turn into net oil importers by the end 
of this decade. Import options from Africa and Europe are a 
high strategic priority as well as an economic necessity since 
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African and European crude oil has lower sulphur content 
and is more environment-friendly. Russia is a potential 
energy asset to the Asia-Pacific region. However, to transport 
gas from there, India will need to construct a 3,700-km-long 
pipeline, which is not commercially feasible. Compared to 
other regions, transportation of energy sources from the Gulf 
is cheaper. Therefore, the possibility of diversifying the 
regions from which to acquire oil and gas supplies in the 
near h t u r e  seems somewhat remote. 
In the subcontinent, Pakistan has not been cooperating with 
India on Indo-Iranian energy schemes. The ambitious plan 
of the, Russian company, Gazprom, to connect Iranian gas 
to India through the Pakistani coastal areas is yet to be 
initiated. Again, due  to. Pakistan’s reluctance, the 
Turkmenistan pipeline could not be connected with India 
and it terminated to Pakistan only via Afghanistan. Despite 
Bangladesh possessing a good reserve of natural gas and 
India offering a huge market, Dhaka is reluctant to cooperate. 
And, its internal p&ty politics does not allow it to take a 
decision in favour of India. 
However, energy resources are not directly usable. They 
have to be developed, produced, transformed into usable 
energy and transported to consumers. Infrastructure 
networking is very important for ensuring smooth energy 
supply. But India lacks sufficient infrastructure facilities, 
which poses a formidable challenge to its energy security. 
After many years of strenuous efforts, Hydrocarbon Vision 
2025 was formulated but India still lacks an integrated 
energy policy. There are problems of enforcement, 
implementation and integration of various approaches 
required for a comprehensive energy security plan. A related 
challenge is bureaucratic nepotism involving a plethora of 
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ministries and departments of petroleum and natural gas, 
coal, electricity, non-conventional energy resources, etc., 
which comes in the way of speedy formulation and 
implementation of a security policy. The implementation of 
Hydrocarbon Vision 2025 is still hanging fire. The 
government has adopted a deregulation and liberalisation 
policy, which includes a new exploration licensing policy 
and dismantling of the APM. The objective behind the latter 
:-was to establish a free and competitive market for petroleum 
products and free companies from price control. But the 
ground reality is that decisions are still dictated by the 
Government. 
Recommendations 
First, it should encourage the use of renewable sources of 
energy like solar, wind and hydroelectricity in large scale. 
Second, it should take appropriate legal, fiscal and regulatory 
steps to create a more attractive environment for foreign 
investors such' as streamlining the license approval process 
for private power producers, offering more incentives for 
upstream oil and gas exploration and promoting joint 
ventures. 
Third, it should improve energy infrastructure, which 
includes establishment of new refineries, urban gas 
transmission and distribution networks, a unified national 
grid and improved transportation facility. 
Fourth, New Delhi should consider promoting and 
strengthening its oil diplomacy on a regular basis. 
Fifth, it should upgrade its organisation and technical skill. 
Lastly, it should formulate an urgent energy security policy 
and implement it without delay. 
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Finally, India would easily overcome the US strategic 
preponderance  and effectively b lock  Washington's 
diplomatic and military unilateralism by cooperating and 
allying with Russia, and with certain Asian nations such 
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